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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
________________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
JOHN SANTIAGO, #07-A-1732,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND ORDER
RJI #16-1-2008-0735.218
INDEX # 2008-1957
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

GEORGE B. ALEXANDER, Chairman,
NYS Division of Parole,
Respondent.
________________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the petition of John Santiago, verified on December 23, 2008, and filed in
the Franklin County Clerk’s office on December 29, 2008. Petitioner, who is now an
inmate at the Auburn Correctional Facility, challenged the October 31/November 1, 2007
determination denying him parole, but only to the extent it was directed that he be held
for an additional 24 months with a scheduled re-appearance in November of 2009. In
this regard petitioner sought a Court order directing respondent to conduct “ . . . a final
revocation hearing at the conclusion of petitioner’s intervening [2007] sentence, in
accordance with [Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii)] . . .”
By Decision and Judgment dated February 24, 2010 the petition was dismissed.
Petitioner’s motion for leave to reargue with respect to the Decision and Judgment of
February 24, 2010, including his memorandum of law in support thereof, was filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on April 5, 2010. Although respondent requested, and
received, an extension of time to submit papers in response to petitioner’s motion, the
Court has no record of having received opposing papers.
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On March 18, 1992, petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Bronx County, to
a controlling indeterminate sentence of 8 to 24 years upon his convictions of the crimes
of Manslaughter 1°, Criminal Possession of a Weapon 2° and Assault 2° . He was released
from DOCS custody to parole supervision on September 6, 2000, but arrested on July 8,
2006, in connection with new criminal charges. On March 22, 2007, petitioner was
sentenced in Rockland County Court, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate
sentence of 1 ½ to 3 years upon his conviction of the crime of Attempted Criminal
Possession of a Forged Instrument 2°. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
petitioner’s parole was revoked following a final parole revocation hearing. Rather,
petitioner’s parole was revoked by operation of law as a result of his March 22, 2007
conviction and sentencing for a felony committed while at liberty under parole
supervision. See Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii).
Petitioner was received back into DOCS custody on March 29, 2007, certified as
entitled to 264 days of jail time credit. At that time DOCS officials determined petitioner
still owed 8 years, 2 months and 20 days against the undischarged maximum term of the
1992 indeterminate sentence. That undischarged term was aggregated with the maximum
term of petitioner’s 2007 indeterminate sentence pursuant to Penal Law §70.30(1)(b).
See People ex rel Gill v. Greene, 12 NY3d 1. Accordingly, the maximum expiration,
conditional release and parole eligibility dates with respect to petitioner’s multiple
sentences were calculated as September 24, 2017, December 27, 2015, and January 4,
2008, respectively.
On October 31, 2007, petitioner appeared before a three-member Parole Board in
anticipation of his January 4, 2008 parole eligibility date. At the conclusion of the
October 31, 2007 hearing parole was denied and it was directed that petitioner be held for
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an additional 24 months with his next Parole Board appearance scheduled for November
2009.
Petitioner’s application for relief in this proceeding was ultimately premised upon
the assertion that his aggregate maximum term of imprisonment could be broken down
into discrete segments corresponding to the maximum term of each underlying,
consecutive indeterminate sentence. In this regard petitioner asserted that he would not
commence serving the 8 years, 2 months and 20 days still owing against the 24-year
maximum term of his 1992 indeterminate sentence until he first completed serving the
3-year maximum term of his consecutive, 2007 indeterminate sentence . Assuming the
viability of this foundation argument, petitioner went on to assert, in effect, that although
his October 31, 2007 Parole Board appearance was properly scheduled to coincide with
the expiration of the 1½-year minimum period of incarceration associated with his 2007
indeterminate sentence, his next scheduled appearance following the 24-month hold
would not occur until November of 2009, approximately “. . . 6 months over the legal
requirements of the new [2007] sentence and 6 months into the un-discharged term [of
the 1992 sentence].” According to the petitioner, the respondent would not have statutory
authority to consider him for discretionary parole release in November of 2009 “. . .
because the fact of the matter is that the petitioner herein would have completed the legal
requirements of the new [2007] sentence in accordance with [Executive Law §] 259[i](3)(d)(iii) and would be detained on the sole premises of a parole violation.”(Emphasis
in original). Petitioner went on to argue that when he completed service of the 2007
indeterminate sentence- presumably, according to his reasoning, on July 4, 2009 - his
then continuing detention in DOCS custody would be based solely on the underlying
parole violation with his custodial status subject to review at that time under the
provisions of Executive Law §259-i(3)(f)(x).
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Petitioner’s request for relief in this proceeding was premised not only upon the
statutory arguments, outlined above, but also upon an equal protection claim that
parolees convicted/sentenced in other jurisdictions are entitled to final revocation
hearings/custodial dispositions upon the expiration of their intervening, out-of-state
sentences pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(3)(f)(x) whereas parole violators, like
himself, convicted/sentenced in New York State only receive ongoing discretionary parole
release consideration pursuant to Executive Law §§259-i(3)(d)(iii) and 259-i(2).
“A motion for leave to reargue . . . shall be based upon matters of fact or law
allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court . . .” CPLR §2221(d)(2). Such a
motion is directed to the sound discretion of the Court. See Loris v. S&W Realty Corp,
16 AD3d 729. Despite the statutory nomenclature, “[r]eargument is not designed to afford
the unsuccessful party successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided . . .
or to present arguments different from those originally asserted . . .” William P. Pahl
Equipment Corp v. Kassis, 182 AD2d 22, 27 (citations omitted).
In petitioner’s motion for leave to reargue he initially asserts, in effect, that the
Court misapprehended the provisions of Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii) and, in doing so,
failed to effectuate the appropriate legislative intent. The statutory provision in question
provides, in relevant part, that “when a . . . parolee . . . has been convicted of a new felony
committed while under such [parole] supervision and a new indeterminate . . . sentence
has been imposed, the [parole] board’s rules shall provide for a final declaration of
delinquency. The inmate shall then be notified in writing that his release has been
revoked on the basis of the new conviction . . . The inmate’s next appearance before the
board shall be governed by the legal requirements of said new indeterminate . . .
sentence . . .” Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii), the Court notes, was added by L 1984, ch
238, approved and effective as of June 19, 1984. Although Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii)
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has been amended since 1984, its provisions, insofar as relevant to this proceeding, have
not changed since enactment.
In its Decision and Judgment of February 24, 2008 the Court, citing People v.
Buss, 11 NY3d 553, rejected petitioner’s argument that in July of 2009 he completed
serving the 3-year maximum term of his 2007 indeterminate sentence and commenced
serving the 8 years, 2 months and 20 days remaining against the undischarged maximum
term of his 1992 indeterminate sentence. In this regard the Court found that “[w]here,
as here, an individual is subject to multiple indeterminate sentences of imprisonment,
running consecutively, the respective minimum periods and maximum terms are added
pursuant to Penal Law §70.30(1)(b) to yield a single, aggregate indeterminate sentence.
An inmate serving such a single, aggregate indeterminate sentence, moreover, remains
subject to all of the component sentences for the duration of the aggregate maximum term
of imprisonment.”
Although petitioner’s motion papers express concern with respect to perceived
implications of the Court’s reliance on Buss, the Court finds no basis to conclude that it
misapprehended the import of Buss. In addition, the Court finds nothing in the statutory
language of Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii) to suggest that an individual, such as
petitioner, convicted of a new felony committed while under parole supervision and
sentenced to a new indeterminate sentence, must be afforded a parole revocation hearing
after “completing” the new sentence so that a delinquent time assessment can be imposed
in connection with the “remaining” undischarged term of such individual’s initial
sentence. As noted by the Court of Appeals in People ex rel Harris v. Sullivan, 74 NY2d
305, where a parolee is convicted of a new felony and sentenced in New York “ . . . a final
parole revocation hearing would be a vain gesture because no fact finding by the Board
of Parole would be necessary to ascertain that the parolee has in fact violated the
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conditions of his parole. The court of conviction and sentence would have already
undisputably established that reality. Additionally, when a parolee is convicted of a New
York felony and a new indeterminate sentence is imposed, a final parole revocation
hearing is not needed to fix the parolee’s reappearance before the Board because the
violator’s reappearance date is automatically fixed by law at the time of sentencing for the
new felony.” Id. At 310 (citations omitted).
The petitioner’s references to Sparago v. New York State Board of Parole, 71 NY2d
943 and Maguire v. New York State Division of Parole, 304 AD2d 1003, do not persuade
the Court that a contrary conclusion is warranted. The petitioners in each of those cases
were convicted and sentenced in New York in connection with new felonies committed
while under parole supervision. In Sparago, however, where the administrative and/or
statutory revocation of parole was vacated by stipulation, the Court confronted a situation
where, despite Mr. Sparago’s conviction and sentencing in connection with new charges,
his release on parole from the original charges was never considered to have been
effectively revoked. The Maguire petitioner, who was originally convicted/sentenced in
1985, was convicted in 1992 of a new crime committed while under parole supervision.
Sentencing calculations with respect to the 1992 conviction, however, were erroneously
made without considering the unexpired 1985 sentence. Mr. Maguire was released to
parole supervision for a second time in 1997 but was subsequently convicted/sentenced
in connection with an additional crime committed while under parole supervision. It was
not until that time that the error in calculating the release dates for Mr. Maguire’s 1992
conviction was discovered. Although the Appellate Division, Third Department noted that
Mr. Maguire’s parole from his 1985 conviction was revoked by operation of law when he
was convicted/sentenced in 1992 (Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii)), no delinquency was
ever established for such parole violation. Thus the Maguire court faced a situation,
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similar to that faced by the Sparago court, where a petitioner was convicted/sentenced
in New York for a felony committed while under parole supervision but there was an
underlying flaw in the parole revocation process. In the case at bar, however, no such flaw
is apparent. The record herein contains no indication that the statutory revocation of
petitioner’s parole following his 2007 conviction/sentencing was vacated by stipulation
or otherwise. In addition, on June 1, 2007, after petitioner’s return to DOCS custody, he
was declared delinquent as of July 8, 2006 - the day that the offense underlying his 2007
conviction was committed (Exhibit J, annexed to the petition). See Jarrell v. Rodriguez,
167 AD2d 776.
In his motion for leave to reargue petitioner also asserts, in effect, that this Court
overlooked a matter of law in failing to consider the impact of the 1979 decision of the
Court of Appeals in Lindsay v. New York State Board of Parole, 48 NY2d 883, rev’g 63
AD2d 997. Mr. Lindsay allegedly violated the conditions of parole release in 1973 but no
revocation hearing had been conducted as of the 1977 commencement of his CPLR Article
78 proceeding seeking to vacate the four-year-old parole violation charges. A “parole
eligibility hearing” had been conducted in 1977 in conjunction with a new conviction.1 The
Court of Appeals in Lindsay reversed the Appellate Division, Second Department, finding
that the conduct of the parole eligibility hearing did not render academic the failure to
hold a final parole revocation hearing. According to the Court of Appeals, “[d]ue to its
different nature and scope, the eligibility hearing could not serve as a substitute for the
final revocation hearing.” 48 NY2d 883, 884.
Petitioner appears to argue that in the Decision and Judgment of February 24,
2010 this Court permitted the October/November 2007 discretionary parole denial

1

None of the pending parole violation charges, however, alleged the commission of a new crime.
63 AD2d 997.
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determination to serve as a substitute for a final parole revocation hearing, in
contravention of Lindsay. This argument, however, fails to take into consideration the
fact that Lindsay was decided prior to the 1984 enactment of Executive Law §259i(3)(d)(iii). The Court of Appeals was thus confronted with a situation where Mr.
Lindsay’s parole had not been revoked prior to discretionary parole release consideration
and it rejected the argument that such discretionary consideration could serve as a
substitute for a final parole revocation hearing. In the case at bar, however, petitioner’s
parole was revoked by operation of law (Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii)) on March 22,
2007 when he was convicted of a new felony committed while under parole supervision
and a new indeterminate sentence of imprisonment was imposed. With his parole
revoked by operation of law, petitioner appeared before the Parole Board on October 31,
2007 for discretionary release consideration. The timing of that appearance was governed
by the legal requirements of petitioner’s March 22, 2007 sentence in accordance with the
provisions of Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii). See People ex rel Harris v. Sullivan, 74
NY2d 305 at 310. The Court therefore finds that under the facts and circumstances of this
case the enactment of Executive Law §259-i(3)(d)(iii) has rendered Lindsay irrelevant.
Finally, the Court finds no basis to conclude that it overlooked or misapprehended
any matter of fact or law in connection with petitioner’s equal protection claim. The
distinctions associated with the re-release to parole supervision procedures applicable
after the revocation of parole by operation of law, as opposed to such procedures
applicable after the revocation of parole following a final hearing, were spelled out in
detail on pages 9 through 12 of the court’s Decision and Judgment of February 24, 2010.
The issue of whether or not such distinctions constitute an equal protection violation
appears to be one of first impression. Although petitioner obviously disagrees with this
Court’s February 24, 2010 decision rejecting his equal protection claim, a motion for leave
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to reargue is not a proper procedural vehicle to simply rehash the issue. See Bankers
Trust Company of California, N.A. v. Payne, 188 Misc 2d 726.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ORDERED, that petitioner’s motion for leave to reargue is denied.

Dated:

July 22, 2010 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice

9 of 9

